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Notes and Comments
The Tax Consequences of a Punitive Damages Award
By Brock D. Phillps*

As punitive damages awards in civil litigation have grown in size
and frequency,1 the tax impact on the parties involved has become increasingly important. Two significant tax issues are presented by such
awards: whether a business forced to pay a punitive damages award
may deduct its payment as an ordinary and necessary business expense;
and whether the recipient of such an award must include it in gross
income. Both issues present tax practitioners with problems not soluble
solely by reference to the Internal Revenue Code (Code or I.R.C.) and
the regulations thereunder.
The deductibility issue has evaded precise resolution because punitive damages are not specifically addressed in the Code or regulations
and because there has been no litigation directly addressing the issue.
A number of early cases held that business litigation costs generally are
deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses. 2 Other cases held that
public policy precludes deduction of litigation expenses arising from
illegal or immoral business activities.3 The deductibility issue accordingly could have turned on whether this public policy exception ap-4
plied to a punitive damages award. In the Tax Reform Act of 1969,
however, Congress limited the use of public policy as a basis for the
denial of a deduction to specific situations delineated in section 162 of
* B.A., 1973, Whitman College. Member, Third Year Class.
1. DuBois, Punitive Damages in PersonalInjury, Products Liability and Professional
Mapraciice Cases: Bonanza or Disaster,43 INS. COUNSEL J. 344, 346 (1976).
2. Eg., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320
U.S. 467 (1943); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); Urquhart v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954); Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1936);
-Howard v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 375 (1931).
3. Eg., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931);
Faulk v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 948 (1956); Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A.
560 (1932). Cf. Scioto Provision Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 439 (1947) (payments of penalties in settlement not deductible). See generally Schwartz, Business Expenses Contraryto
PublicPolicy: An Evaluationofthe Lilly Case, 8 TAX. L. REv. 241 (1953); Zimmerman, FastGrowing PublicPolicy Doctrine ThreatensMany Necessary Expenses, 12 J. TAX. 106 (1960).
4. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969), reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 10.
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the Code. 5 A punitive damages award assessed in civil litigation is not
one of the proscribed deductions and hence should now be deductible.
The early public policy exception to allowing deductions nevertheless
continues to affect the deductibility of punitive damages payments; the
of such an exInternal Revenue Service recently denied the deduction
6
pense apparently on the basis of public policy.
The taxability of a punitive damages award to the recipient appeared clearly resolved by the 1954 decision in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,7 in which the Supreme Court held that such payments
must be included in gross income. In 1975, however, Revenue Ruling
75-458 revived the issue by allowing the exclusion of punitive damages
awarded on account of personal injury or sickness. Although text writers in the tax field have recognized the importance of Revenue Ruling
75-45,9 it has received scant attention from the tax services.10 Consequently, the ruling could provide a serious trap for the unwary tax
practitioner.
This Note examines the law in both of these areas. The Note first
discusses the evolution of the public policy exception to the deductibility of business litigation expenses and the codification of the exception
by Congress, concluding that punitive damages are not properly within
its scope. Next, the propriety of allowing the deduction of punitive
damages awards and the possibility of future attacks on such deductions on grounds other than public policy is analyzed. Turning to the
excludibility of punitive damages awards, the Note considers the merits
of Revenue Ruling 75-45 and argues that the ruling is a correct interpretation of the law and a sound application of the principles underlying the Internal Revenue Code. Finally, the types of actions properly
within the scope of this exclusion are discussed.
Deductibility of Punitive Damages Awards
The deductibility of punitive damages payments arising out of
civil litigation is not addressed in the Code or regulations, nor has it
been directly litigated. As a general proposition, courts have considered all business-related litigation expenses, including the payment of
5. I.R.C. § 162(c) (bribes and illegal kickbacks), (f) (fines and penalties), (g) (antitrust
treble damages).
6. I.R.S. Letter Rulings 7816021 (1978).
7.

348 U.S. 426 (1955).

8. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47.
9. See J. FREELAND, S. LIND & R. STEPHENS, FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION 207 n.12 (2d ed. 1977).
10. But see [197912 FED. TAXES (P-H) 8350; [1979] 1 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH)
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judgments and settlements, to be deductible business expenses." The
courts have recognized, however, an exception to the general rule and
have held that public policy bars the deduction of litigation expenses
arising from illegal or immoral conduct. 12 Until 1978, no attempt had
been made to apply the public policy exception to punitive damages.
But in that year the Commissioner issued Private Letter Ruling
7816021,' 3 denying the deduction of a punitive award. Although no
explicit reason was given for the denial, it may be inferred from the
citations in the ruling that the decision was based on the public policy
exception. An examination of the evolution and scope of the public
policy exception to the deductibility of business litigation expenses
reveals that despite this ruling punitive damages never were properly
within its scope.
Evolution of the Public Policy Exception
Kornhauser v. United States' 4 was the first major decision by the
United States Supreme Court on the deductibility of litigation costs. In
Kornhauser, a taxpayer had expended $10,000 in attorney's fees defending a suit for accounting brought by a former partner. The Commissioner denied a deduction for the legal expense and the lower courts
affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed and held that the expenditure
was an ordinary and necessary business expense. The Court emphasized that when a suit is connected with or results from a taxpayer's
business the litigation expenses are properly deductible.' 5
The Board of Tax Appeals expanded the Kornhauser doctrine by
allowing deduction of the cost of an out-of-court settlement in Howard
v. Commissioner,16 observing: "Though the Kornhausercase involved
only legal fees, we believe the reasoning employed applies equally to
the compromise payment made to settle the lawsuit. This expense grew
directly out of, and proximately resulted from, the business dealings
between the parties."' 7 Five years later, in Anderson v. Commissioner,',
the Tenth Circuit further expanded the Kornhauserdoctrine by permit11. Eg., Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); Ditmars v. Commissioner,
302 F.2d 481 (2d Cir. 1962); Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1936); Howard v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 375 (1931).
12. Efg., Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931);
Faulk v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 948 (1956); Gould Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A.
560 (1932); cf.Scioto Provision Co. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 439 (1947) (payments of penalties in settlement not deductible).
13. LR.S. Letter Rulings 7816021 (1978).
14. 276 U.S. 145 (1928).
15. Id at 153.
16. 22 B.T.A. 375 (1931).
17. Id at 378.
18. 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1936).
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ting deduction of the cost of a judgment. The court held that in light of
Kornhauser a farmer was entitled to deduct the amount of a judgment
against him arising from a collision which occurred when the farmer
was driving to pick up a laborer.' 9
As a result of these cases, later courts generally were prepared to
consider all business-related litigation expenses-including court costs,
legal fees, and settlement and judgment payments-deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. 20 The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit summed up the rationale for this line of decisions:
What is ordinary is that the conduct of almost any trade or business
will give rise to claims, many invalid but some valid; resisting such
claims, paying judgments rendered on some, and settling others, is
thus an "ordinary and necessary" expense of "carrying on any trade
or business" within § 162.21
This doctrine has become an accepted element of current tax law; the
general rule is still that all22litigation expenses related to the conduct of
a business are deductible.
Throughout the development of this doctrine, the courts were developing a public policy exception to its application. Legal expenses
that resulted from certain types of illegal conduct were held to be nondeductible on the ground that allowing the deduction would weaken
the punitive effect of the laws involved and thus be contrary to the
public interest.23 In Burroughs Building Material Co. v. Commissioner,2 4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals refused to allow the deduction of either a fine levied against a corporate taxpayer for price
fixing or the legal expenses incurred in defending against the fine. The
deduction of the fine was disallowed because the court felt it was contrary to public policy to recognize these fines, "in any way beneficial to
fees was disallowed as
the taxpayer"; 2 5 the deduction for attorney's
26
tainted by the nature of the litigation.
Because of the philosophical nature of the public policy exception
and the lack of statutory guidance, courts have had difficulty agreeing
on its exact nature and scope. Only four years after Burroughs, in
Helvering v. Hampton,2 7 the Ninth Circuit allowed the deduction of a
judgment rendered for fraudulent cancellation of a lease. The court
19. Id at 459.
20. E.-, Trust of Bingham v. Commissioner, 325 U.S. 365 (1945); Howard v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1284 (1959).

21.

Ditmars v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 481,485 (2d Cir. 1962) (emphasis by the court).

22.
23.

See [1979] 2 STAND. FED. TAX REP. (CCH) 1348.
Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931); Gould

Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 560 (1932).
24. 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931).
25. Id at 179.
26. Id at 180.
27. 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
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distinguished the payment of a fine for a public offense from restitution
for tortious conduct in a private transaction.28 This distinction is
sound. The commission of a public offense, meaning a statutory violation, hardly gives rise to an ordinary and necessary expense because
clearly prohibited criminal conduct is not properly within the scope of
any business. Tort liability, on the other hand, can arise from a multitude of business or professional transactions that are a normal part of
doing business. Liability may arise, for example, from an innocent
mistake or the unsanctioned conduct of a subordinate. The possibility
that such events may occur and give rise to legal expenses, including
the payment of a judgment, is an ordinary risk of business life. The
Hampton court properly concluded that it would be "difficult to believe" that Congress expected the taxing officials to determine which
settlements made for alleged business torts involved unethical conduct
and should be denied a deduction. 29 Thus, the logical place to draw
the line for deductions is where the conduct is criminal.
The Supreme Court implicitly approved of the distinction between
30
public offenses and private misconduct in Commissioner v. Heininger.
Heininger involved the deductibility of attorney's fees and other legal
expenses incurred by a dentist in resisting the issuance of a "fraud order" by the Postmaster General which had threatened the survival of
his business. The Court allowed the deduction, stating that the allegations of fraud in no way made his defense any less "ordinary and necessary."' 31 The Court emphasized that "the mere fact that an
expenditure bears a remote relation to an illegal act does not make it
nondeductible. 32 The only examples cited by the Court as proper applications of the doctrine were cases in which a statutory fine or penalty
had been imposed or in which expenses had been incurred to exert undue influence on federal legislation. 33 The Supreme Court's refusal to
expand the doctrine in Heininger and the Court's limited citation to
proper applications of the doctrine-statutory fines and the purchasing
of political influence-both evince a desire to limit the applicability of
the public policy exception.
The Supreme Court spoke on the public policy exception for the
second time in Lily v. Commissioner34 and again refused to expand the
application of the exception. In Lil , the Court allowed the deduction
of kickback payments, not illegal in themselves, made by opticians to
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id at 359-60.
Id at 360.
320 U.S. 467 (1943).
Id at 472.
Id at 474.
Id at 473.
343 U.S. 90 (1952).
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doctors who referred patients to them. The Court noted that "[tihere is
no statement in the Act, or in its accompanying regulations, prohibiting
the deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses on the
ground that they violate or frustrate public policy. ' 35 The Court further stated that if ordinary and necessary expenses are to be denied
deduction they must "'frustrate sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct,' "36 and the "policies frustrated must be national or state policies evidenced by some
governmental declaration of them. '37 The clear intent of the Court in
Lilly was to limit use of the public policy exception to instances in
which a state or federal statute had been violated or the payment itself
was illegal. The unanimous opinion confirmed and strengthened the
circumscribed approach to the public policy exception expressed in
Heininger.
Despite Heininger and Lilly, many tax courts continued to apply
the public policy exception broadly,3 8 as exemplified by Faulk v. Commissioner.39 In Faulk, the tax court denied the deduction of the costs of
a judgment rendered for presentation of false claims to the federal government on a milk supply contract and the attorney's fees incurred in
fighting the charges. In an opinion rich in indignation the court asserted:
We cannot believe that payment of damages for fraud committed by
a taxpayer against his Government where, as here, the fraud was
knowingly, deliberately, and personally perpetrated by the taxpayer,
can be claimed by him in a tax proceeding as either ordinary or necessary business expense.
Sound public policy would forbid such a deduction. The allowance of the instant deduction would frustrate the sharply defined national policy proscribing the conduct of knowingly presenting false
claims to the Government. . . .Perpetration of fraud in the conduct
of a business is neither ordinary nor necessary, and neither are the
expenses resulting therefrom. 4°
The court went on to justify its denial of the deduction of attorney's
fees by saying that such payments were in the same category as the
penalty.41 The court distinguished Heininger,which had allowed a deduction for attorney's fees, on the grounds that in Heininger the tax35. Id at 94.
36. Id.at 96 (quoting Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943)) (emphasis
omitted).
37. 343 U.S. at 97.
38. See James E. Caldwell & Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 597 (1955); Union Packing
Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C.M. (CCH) 1188 (1955); Estate of MacCrowe v. Commissioner,
14 T.C.M. (CCH) 958 (1955).
39. 26 T.C. 948 (1956).
40. Id. at 950-51.
41. Id at 952.
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payers survival as a business was threatened.42
The Faulc court's denial of the deduction for attorney's fees was
severely out of step with the Supreme Court's decisions in Lilly and
Heininger. Heininger specifically allowed the deduction of attorney's
fees in a fraud case and emphasized that simply because a normally
deductible expense bears some relationship to an illegal act does not
make that expense nondeductible. 43 Moreover, the Faulk court's refusal to allow the deduction of the fraud damages disregarded the
Supreme Court's apparent attempts to limit the public policy exception
to statutory violations.
Only two years after Paulk, in the companion cases of Commissioner v. Sullivan44 and Tank Truck Rentals,Inc. v. Commissioner,45 the
Supreme Court reviewed its earlier decisions and reiterated the limitations on the public policy exception. In Sullivan, the Court allowed an
illegal gambling establishment to deduct its ordinary operating expenses. The Court stressed that taxation policy requires taxing a business on its net income, not its gross income, and that an exception to
the taxing scheme is not warranted merely because the business is illegal.46 The Court commented that exceptions to the rule must be made
by Congress, not by the courts. 47
The companion case, Tank Truck Rentals, involved the deduction
of fines paid by interstate truckers for truck weight violations. In denying deduction of the fines, the Court elaborated on the nature and
scope of the public policy exception and reemphasized the limitations
established in Heininger and Lilly. 48 The Court stated that while a
public policy exception does exist, its boundaries must be narrow to
49
avoid conflict with the congressional intent to tax net income only.
The level of "frustration of state policy" required to trigger the exception exists in two circumstances: (1) when the expenditure sought to be
deducted is itself illegal; and (2) when the payment is a fine or penalty
for a statutory violation.5 0 While the Court continued to advocate a
flexible approach, both its insistence that the policy violated must be
not merely a public policy, but rather a national or state policy evidenced by some governmental declaration, and its continued use of
statutory fines and penalties or illegal expenditures as the only exam42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id
320 U.S. at 474.
356 U.S. 27 (1958).
356 U.S. 30 (1958).
356 U.S. at 29.
Id
356 U.S. at 34-35.
Id at 35.
Id
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ples of proper applications of the exception, strongly suggest limiting
the exception to these two situations.
The Supreme Court once again addressed the public policy issue
in 1966 in Commissioner v. Tellier,51 its most forceful discussion of the
public policy exception to date. In allowing the deduction of legal fees
expended by a securities dealer who was convicted of violating various
federal statutes the Court reemphasized the points previously made in
Heininger, Lilly, Sullivan, and Tank Truck Rentals. 52 The Court repeated that the income tax is a tax on net income, not a sanction
against wrongdoing, 53 and that exceptions to the rule allowing the deduction of all ordinary and necessary expenses must be legislative, not
judicial, in all but the most limited circumstances. 54 Accordingly, no
judge or jury's concept of public policy is sufficient to invoke the exception; rather, only national or state policies evidenced by government
declaration are sufficient.
Following Tellier, lower courts began to recognize the limitations
on the scope of the public policy doctrine. In Grossman & Sons Inc. v.
Commissioner,55 the tax court allowed deduction of a payment in settlement of a claim by the federal government for damages arising out
of a fraudulent breach of contract. In reaching its decision the court
chronicled the evolving restriction of the public policy exception, observing:
We feel that our position in the Faulk case must be reexamined in
the light of the four or five cases decided by the Supreme Court since
our decision in the Faulk case, which we believe tend to limit rather
than expand the public policy concept and point up the fact that the
lower courts appear to have been more prone in the past to rely on
the public
policy concept to disallow deductions than the Supreme
56
Court.

As evidenced by the opinion in Grossman, the limited nature of the
public policy exception finally may have been explicated often enough
and with sufficient clarity to avoid future judicial confusion over its
scope.
The development of the public policy exception thus makes clear
that punitive damages awarded in civil litigation do not properly come
within the scope of the exception. Early case law had established that
litigation expenses, including attorney's fees, payment of the judgment
itself, and settlement costs arising out of business activities are ordinary
51.

383 U.S. 687 (1966).

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id at 693-94.
Id at 691.
Id at 693-94.
48 T.C. 15 (1967).
Id at 31-32.
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and necessary. 57 The public policy exception to this general policy of
deductibility was limited by the Supreme Court to only those situations
in which the payment sought to be deducted was itself illegal or was a
fine levied for a violation of an enunciated state or federal policy. 58 A
punitive damages award arising out of civil litigation does not fit into
either category and thus, on this basis alone, should be deductible
under the general rule applying to business litigation expenses.
Statutory Adoption of the Limited Public Policy Exception
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969,59 Congress ended its years of silence on the matter and enacted a statutory scheme that reflects the
Supreme Court's narrow treatment of the public policy exception. Section 902 of the Act 60 modified section 162 of the Internal Revenue
and (g).
Code by amending subsection (c) and by adding subsections (f)
The Code now specifically forbids, on the basis of public policy, the
deduction of fines or penalties paid to a government for the violation of
any law, 61 any portion of treble damages payments under the antitrust
laws following a related criminal conviction, 62 and bribes or kickbacks. 63 The Senate committee that prepared the section noted: "The
provision for the denial of the deduction for payments in these situations which are deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all
inclusive. Public policy, in other circumstances, generally is not sufficiently clearly defined to justify the disallowance of deductions." 64
Congress thus strongly declared its intent to limit the application of the
as the Supreme Court had been encouraging
public policy exception,
65
since Heininger.
In drafting the Revenue Act of 1971,66 Congress reaffirmed its desire to preempt judicial discretion in the application of the public policy
exception. The committee report on section 310 of the Act,67 which
57. See, efg., Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); Commissioner v. Heininger,
320 U.S. 467 (1943); Kornhauser v. United States, 276 U.S. 145 (1928); Urquhart v. Commissioner, 215 F.2d 17 (3d Cir. 1954); Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir.
1936); Howard v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 375 (1931).
58. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966); Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90 (1952); Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
59. Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487 (1969), reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 10.
60. Id § 902, 83 Stat. at 710, reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 10, 147.
61. I.R.C. § 162().
62. Id § 162(g).
63. Id § 162(c).
64. S.REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 274 (1969), reprintedin [19691 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2027, 2311, also reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 10, 597.
65. Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
66. Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 497 (1971), reprintedin1972-1 C.B. 443.
67. Id § 310, 85 Stat. at 525, reprintedin 1972-1 C.B. at 460-6 1.
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modified and expanded the bribe and kickback provisions of I.R.C.
section 162, declared: "The Committee continues to believe that the
should be denied should remain
determination of when a deduction
'6 8
under the control of Congress."
Congress' move to exercise exclusive control over the public policy
exception was acknowledged by the Commissioner in Revenue Ruling
74-323.69 The ruling involved the deductibility of the cost of advertising which may have been in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In determining that the expenses were deductible, the Commissioner
noted:
The legislative history of section 902 of the Tax Reform Act of 1969
discloses that an expenditure will be nondeductible under section 162
on public policy grounds only if it fits within one of the categories
described in section 162 (c), (f), or (g) of the Code .... Thus, section
162(c), (f), and (g) obviates the necessity for determining whether
particular trade or business expenditures violate sharply defined pubstating what trade or business expenditures
lic policy by specifically
70
are nondeductible.
Moreover, a year later, in Treasury Decision 7345,71 the Commissioner
amended section 1.162 of the regulations to acknowledge Congress'
declarations on the public policy exception. This amendment provided
that:
A deduction for an expense paid or incurred after December 30,
1969, which would otherwise be allowable under section 162 shall
not be denied on the grounds that allowance of such deduction
See section 162(c),
would frustrate a sharply defined public policy.
72
(f), and (g) and the regulations thereunder.
The Commissioner thus has recognized the congressional intent to limit
the scope of the public policy exception.
Congress has clearly delimited the scope of the public policy exception by codifying those circumstances to which it applies. All other
ordinary and necessary business expenses are not to be denied as deductions on grounds of public policy. Punitive damages awarded in a
civil suit are not one of the enumerated exceptions; 73 accordingly, their
deductibility should not be challenged.
Some Internal Revenue Service officers are either confused or unconvinced and would deny a deduction for the cost of a punitive damages award. In Private Ruling 7816021, 74 a self-insuring medical
68.
CONG.

69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

S. REP. No. 92-437, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1971), reprintedin [1971] U.S.
& AD. NEWS 1918, 1979, also reprintedin 1972-1 C.B. 443, 599.
Rev. Rul. 74-323, 1974-2 C.B. 40.
Id at 40.
T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51.
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a), T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51, 52.
I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g).
I.R.S. Letter Rulings 7816021 (1978).

CODE
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association was informed that judgments against it for malpractice
were deductible only to the extent that the payments were compensatory:
As a general proposition, we acknowledge that malpractice
judgments and attendant costs are for physicians, "ordinary and necessary" and hence deductible business expenses under section 162(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954. . . .Regarding the amount of
the judgment that may be deducted, it is deductible to the extent that
it compensates the plaintiff for his injuries; i.e. penalties or punitive
damages, specifically designated as such, would not be deductible.
sections 1.162-21 and 1.162-22 of the Income
Code section 162(g),
7
Tax Regulations. "
Although the ruling is not explicitly based on the public policy exception, such a basis can be inferred from its reliance on section 162(g),
relating to antitrust treble damages. In this light, the ruling is clearly
contrary to the repeated actions of Congress, which the Commissioner
twice acknowledged. The section of the Code that the drafter of the
private ruling cites does not support denial of the deduction of punitive
damages. 76 Section 162(g) disallows deductions of the penalty portion
of a treble damages antitrust payment imposed for conduct which previously resulted in a criminal conviction. 77 While section 162(g) did
evolve from the public policy exception, it bars only the deduction of
the punitive damages specifically addressed and says nothing about
other types of penalties. Apparently the extensive earlier case law approving the use of a public policy rationale to deny deductions not specifically denied by statute continues to be applied, despite Congress'
attempt to delineate the narrow scope of the public policy doctrine and
to eliminate judicial discretion in the area.
Analysis of Decision to Allow Deduction of Punitive Awards
Arguably, public policy should preclude the tax system from softening judicially imposed punishment. By allowing a deduction for the
payment of a punitive damages award, the tax system mitigates the punitive effect such awards generally are designed to impose; the practical
effect of allowing the deduction may radically decrease the net economic burden depending on the tax circumstances of the offender. Allowing such a tax break to a business that has committed an act
warranting the imposition of punitive damages may well strike many as
75. Id at 1-2.
76. Additionally, the drafter cites Hawkins v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 1023 (1927), and
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955). Neither of these cases supports
the ruling. Both cases address the issue of whether damages received by a litigant are taxable income. Neither case directly or indirectly addresses the question of whether the payor
of such damages may deduct them as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
77. LR.C. § 162(g).
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morally offensive. This Note contends, however, that allowing a deduction for punitive damages awards is consistent with current taxation
policy. Traditionally, the income tax system has been viewed as having
very narrow purposes. This view, long held by the Supreme Court,
considers the tax system to be a method of collecting revenue, not a
method of regulating morality. Commissioner v. Sullivan,78 in which
the Supreme Court held that an illegal business is to be subject to the
same tax treatment as any other business, was perhaps the clearest example of this approach. Application of the public policy exception
within the constraints of this narrow philosophy dictates that deductions for related litigation costs be disallowed only when the expenses
arise from actions in violation of an announced public policy which
provided a clear warning of the loss of the deduction. Only the payment of statutory fines, antitrust treble damages connected with a criminal conviction, and illegal bribes and kickbacks are statutorily
nondeductible. 79 In each of these situations the guilty business can be
charged with knowledge at the time of the violation that the payment
or penalty is not deductible. Congress apparently has decided to eliminate the power of a judge or jury to deny a deduction based on policy
grounds where such policy was not made clear to the taxpayer before
the fact. This is entirely reasonable; punitive damages can be imposed
for infinitely varied types of conduct and a taxpayer is entitled to know
in advance what conduct will have adverse tax consequences.
Another reason that punitive damages payments should be deductible is that Congress has intentionally limited the denial of a deduction to situations in which the standard of proof is higher than that
of a normal civil trial. This was stressed in the Senate Report on the
Tax Reform Act of 1969.80 This report noted that fines and penalties
are not deductible only when imposed as a result of a criminal conviction, which requires an elevated standard of proof."' With regard to
the nondeductibility of portions of an antitrust judgment, the report
noted:
The deduction is denied in these cases (as well as in the case of
bribes and kickbacks described below) only where there has been a
criminal conviction (or plea of guilty or nolo contendere) in a related
case. This means that the deduction is to be denied only in the case
of "hard-core violations" where intent has been clearly proved in a
356 U.S. 27 (1958). See text accompanying notes 44-47 supra.
I.R.C. § 162(c), (f), (g).
S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 274-75 (1969), reprintedin [1969] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2027, 2311-12, also reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 423, 597.
81. Id at 274, [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2311-12, reprintedin 1969-3
C.B. 423, 597.
78.
79.
80.
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criminal proceeding.
The bribes and kickbacks referred to above as requiring a criminal conviction before a deduction can be denied are bribes and kickbacks to
other than governmental officials and employees.8 3 The only situation
in which a deduction for illegal bribes and kickbacks may be denied
without a criminal conviction is where such payments are made to govemnment officials and employees.8 4 This exception is based on the rationale that illegal payments to government officials are "sufficiently
contrary to public policy as not to require the denial of the deduction to
be preceded by the criminal conviction."8 5 For bribes paid to foreign
officials, the Treasury Department must meet a burden of "clear and
convincing evidence" in showing the illegality of the payment.8 6 The
requirement of an elevated standard of proof-almost uniformly a
criminal standard-in combination with the limited purposes of tax
law as a revenue producing system leads to the conclusion that punitive
damages awards should be deductible legal expenses like almost all
other litigation costs.
Possible Future Attacks on Deduction of Punitive Damages Awards
Looking to the future, the question becomes whether the Commissioner and the lower courts will accept the deductibility of punitive
damages awards. The many cases denying deductions on the basis of
public policy demonstrate the reluctance of the lower courts and the
Commissioner to allow a deduction for any "offensive" conduct. The
most likely tool which might be used to deny such deductions is the
basic requirement under Internal Revenue Code section 162 that business expenses must be ordinary and necessary to be deducted.8 7 Arguably, payment of a punitive damages award, linked as it must be to
reckless or intentional misconduct, should not be considered an ordinary and necessary expense of doing business. Although there is no
indication that this approach has been tried, it it seems to present a
possible avenue for barring deduction of punitive damages payments.
The requirement that a deductible business expense be ordinary
and necessary, however, should not be sufficient grounds to deny such a
82.

Id., [1969] U.S.

CODE CONG.

& AD. NEWS at 2312, reprintedin 1969-3 C.B. 423,
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83. Id. at 275, [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2312, reprintedin 1969-3 C.B.
423, 597.
84. Id. at 274-75, [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2312, reprintedin 1969-3
C.B. 423, 597.
85. Id.
86. Id at 275, [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 2312, reprintedin 1969-3 C.B.
423, 597.
87. I.R.C. § 162(a) states: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business. . ...
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deduction. While early case law established that payment of a judgment is ordinary and necessary, punitive damages awards received virtually no scrutiny. In Helvering v. Hampton,88 however, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals commented: "We cannot agree that private
wrongdoing in the course of business is extraordinary within the meaning of the statute allowing deductions for 'ordinary and necessary expenses'." 89 This appears to be the only language that conceivably
addresses the question of whether punitive damages might be ordinary
and necessary expenses. This language hardly can be considered conclusive; the court gave no indication that it even had considered the
punitive damages issue. Perhaps the lower courts, in their haste to attack litigation expenses tainted by improper conduct as a violation of
public policy, simply made no attempt to assess the expenses under the
ordinary and necessary test.
The payment of a court-ordered damages award is certainly necessary, 90 in the sense that it is judically compelled, regardless of whether
the award is punitive or compensatory. Consequently, any attack on
the deductibility of punitive awards likely will concentrate on whether
or not such a payment is ordinary. Current judicial interpretations of
"ordinary" suggest that such payments likely will not be deemed extraordinary by the courts. In Welch v. Helvering,91 the leading case on
the meaning of the term, the Supreme Court emphasized that the event
giving rise to the expense need not be common in the life of a single
business, but that it need only be an occurrence of a type known in the
general business community as a whole. 92 More recently, in Commissioner v. Tellier,93 the Court noted that the principal purpose of the
"ordinary" test of section 162 is to distinguish between expenditures
that are deductible currently as expenses and those that are in the nature of capital expenditures and which must be amortized. 94 The payment of a punitive damages award easily satisfies both the Welch and
the Tellier tests of an ordinary expense. Such payments certainly are
known and experienced in the general business community, and they
are definitely not capital expenditures that must be amortized. Hence,
punitive damages payments should be considered both ordinary and
necessary under section 162.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
Id at 360-61.
See note I1 & accompanying text supra.
290 U.S. 111 (1933).
Id at 113-14.
383 U.S. 687 (1966). See text accompanying notes 5 1-54 supra.
383 U.S. at 689-90.

March 1980]

TAXING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

Taxability of a Punitive Damages Award
The evolution of the law on the taxability of punitive awards is
considerably more straightforward than the law on the deductibility of
such payments. Indeed, until recently there would have been no need
for any discussion of the matter because the law seemed to have been
settled by the Supreme Court over twenty years ago. In Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co. ,95 the Supreme Court held that punitive damages
were taxable income to the recipient. Chief Justice Warren reasoned
that punitive damages were
undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the
taxpayers have complete dominion. The mere fact that the payments
were extracted from the wrongdoers as punishment for unlawful conduct cannot detract from their character as taxable income to the recipients .... It would be an anomaly that could not be justified in

the absence of clear congressional intent to say that a recovery for
actual damages is taxable but not the additional amount extracted as
punishment for the same conduct which caused the injury.96And we
find no such evidence of intent to exempt these payments.
The Glenshaw Glass ruling was incorporated in the regulations under
the Code 97 and remained unquestioned for twenty-one years.
In 1975, however, in Revenue Ruling 75-45,98 the Commissioner

revived the question of the excludibility of punitive damages. The specific issue considered in the ruling was whether an amount received by
the estate of a deceased employee under his employer's aircraft liability
policy could be excluded from gross income. The policy payment was
contingent upon a full release from all claims which were considered
punitive, including payments arising under the local wrongful death
statute. The ruling focused on section 104(a)(2) 99 of the Code, which
excludes from gross income any damages received on account of personal injuries or sickness, and concluded that punitive damages come
within this exclusion:
Section 104 of the Code is a specific statutory exclusion from gross
income within the "except as otherwise provided" clause of section
61(a). Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income "the amount of
95. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
96. Id at 431.
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14(a) (1960) provides in part: "In addition to the items enumerated in section 61(a), there are many other kinds of gross income. For example, punitive
damages such as treble damages under the antitrust laws and exemplary damages for fraud
are gross income."
98. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (1957), discussed at note 97
supra, has not been changed despite the 1975 Revenue Ruling.
99. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) states in part: "Except in the case of amounts attributable to (and
not in excess of) deductions allowed under section 213 (relating to medical, etc., expenses)
for any prior taxable year, gross income does not include ... the amount of any damages
received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. ..."

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 31

any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of
personal injuries or sickness" . . . Therefore, under section
104(a)(2) any damages, whether compensatory or punitive, received
on account of personal injuries or sickness are excludable from gross
income.l°°

The impact of the ruling was to bifurcate the tax treatment of punitive damages. Under the ruling, section 104(a)(2) operates to exclude
from gross income punitive damages arising out of personal injuries or
sickness. Under Glenshaw Glass, all other punitive damages are included in gross income. Since publication of the ruling in 1975, the
issue, not surprisingly, has not been litigated. No taxpayer would have
reason to challenge the Commissioner's willingness to grant an exclusion where none existed before.
Arguably, the language of section 104 does not warrant its extension to punitive damages. The section provides that "gross income
does not include. . . the amount of any damages received (whether by
suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness."10 1 The
statute does not specifically mention punitive damages as within its
scope. Since its enactment in 1918, the statute's substantive language
has remained essentially the same, 10 2 and until 1975 no court or Commissioner had seen fit to declare that section 104 encompassed punitive
damages. Moreover, there is nothing in the legislative history that indicates whether the provision was intended to embrace punitive as well as
compensatory damages. 10 3 Nor are the regulations of any definitive
assistance, providing only that "[t]he term 'damages received (whether
by suit or agreement)' means an amount received (other than workmen's compensation) through prosecution of a legal suit or action
based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement
entered into in lieu of such prosecution."' 1 4 Thus, the Commissioner's
interpretation is not compelled by either the language or the history of
section 104.
The Commissioner's interpretation, however, can be supported by
100. Rev. Rul. 75-45, 1975-1 C.B. 47, 47 (emphasis in original).
101. I.R.C. § 104(a).
102. The 1918 statute provided that gross income did not include "[a]mounts received,
through accident or health insurance or under workmen's compensation acts, as compensation for personal injuries or sickness, plus the amount of any damages received whether by
suit or agreement on account of such injuries or sickness." Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L.
No. 254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat. 1057 (1919). This section was redesignated in 1928, Revenue
Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 562, § 22(b)(5), 45 Stat. 791 (1928), and again in 1954 when it was
divided into multiple sections with the portion applying to damages received being designated § 104(a)(2). Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 591, § 104(a)(2), 68A Stat. 1,

30 (1954).
103.

See J. SEIDMAN, SEIDMAN'S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX

LAWS 1938-1961 at 909 (1938).
104.

Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960).
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a literal reading of the section's language. Although the status of punitive awards arising out of personal injuries is not addressed specifically
in either the Code or the regulations, the language of section 104 is very
broad, exempting "any damages." 0 5 The phrase could encompass punitive as well as compensatory damages. In the absence of any indication of a congressional intent to limit the scope of the section to
compensatory damages, the Commissioner's interpretation seems to be
within the spirit of the generally broad language of the section. The
fact that no one previously recognized the potential application of this
language should not detract from the soundness of the Commissioner's
belated acknowledgement of its applicability to a punitive damages
award. Nor is the ruling necessarily inconsistent with Glenshaw Glass,
in which the court ruled that punitive damages had to be included in
gross income "in recognition of the intention of Congress to tax all
gains except those specifically exempted." 10 6 Indeed, the Commissioner merely concluded that punitive damages fall within the specific
exclusionary language of section 104.
Whether excluding punitive damages from gross income is sound
tax policy is another matter. A number of arguments suggest that such
damages should not be excluded. The general principle that underlies
the income tax is that all new wealth is taxed. 10 7 Generally, only income that is a return of previously invested capital, and therefore not
new wealth, is allowed to escape taxation. Under this standard, a punitive damages award should be taxed. Typically, compensatory damages serve to reimburse victims for losses suffered; punitive damages,
on the other hand, often serve no purpose other than to punish wrongdoers. Taxing a punitive award that is not in fact compensatory places
no unwarranted economic burden on the recipient. The award is not
intended to fulfill any needs of the victim, who presumably has been
fully compensated.
The arguments in favor of allowing the exclusion of a punitive
damages award are essentially twofold. The primary argument is that
the general proposition that all new wealth should be taxed is not always followed nor should it be. In fact, Congress has found it desirable
to make exceptions to this basic proposition to benefit taxpayers in difficult or special circumstances.
A well known example of these exceptions is the exclusion granted
for life insurance payments received upon the death of an insured
under section 101 of the Code. 08 Receipt of life insurance proceeds is
certainly income, yet Congress has decided that it should not be taxed.
105.
106.
107.
108.

I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
348 U.S. at 430.
See Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); I.R.C. § 61.
I.R.C. § 101.
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The reason presumably is to assist the beneficiary in a time of personal
and economic hardship. Similarly, section 105 excludes from gross in0 9 Under the
come amounts received under accident and health plans. 1
general rule, the amount of such a payment normally would be taxable
to the extent it exceeded the cost of the premiums. But Congress chose
to temper the general policy and allow an exception for a taxpayer victimized by illness or injury. The Code contains numerous other examples of exclusions and deductions that create exceptions to the general
rule which are in favor of a taxpayer perceived to need or deserve special relief. 0
Allowing the exclusion of all damages, including punitive damages, on account of personal injuries or sickness is entirely consistent
with the policy of providing tax relief for someone who has suffered
special misfortune. Courts have recognized that the congressional purpose in creating the various exclusions of section 104 was to provide
relief otherwise unavailable for" 'a taxpayer who has the misfortune to
This purpose is served by excluding punibecome ill or injured.' ""'
tive damages as well as compensatory damages. Lost wages recovered
in a compensatory award represent income which would have been
taxed had the accident not occurred. In addition, damages for pain and
suffering or emotional distress are clearly new wealth and would be
taxable under the general rule; yet these payments have always been
sheltered from taxation under section 104. The exclusion of punitive
damages accomplishes exactly the same goal as the exclusion of these
other damages-to provide special tax relief to the victim of tortious
conduct. The relief applies to all damages awarded, regardless of
whether they constitute new wealth. The argument that allowing the
exclusion of punitive damages received on account of personal injuries
is inappropriate because it is inconsistant with the general principle of
taxing all new wealth thus ignores the many other exceptions to this
principle in favor of unfortunate taxpayers.
The second reason for allowing the exclusion of punitive damages
is that many states consider them to be additional compensation for the
victim, 1 2 often in lieu of compensation for emotional distress. It would
109. I.R.C. § 105.
110. E.g., I.R.C. §§ 117 (exclusion of scholarships and fellowship grants), 121 (exclusion
of gain from sale or exchange of residence by individual over 55), 151(d) (additional exemption for blindness), 213 (deductions for medical, dental, and like expenses), 217 (deductions
for moving expenses), 219 (special deductions for certain types of retirement savings).
111. Huddell v. Levin, 395 F. Supp. 64, 87 (D.N.J. 1975) (quoting Epmeier v. United
States, 199 F.2d 508, 511 (7th Cir. 1952)).
112. States which have found punitive damages to be at least in part compensatory include Arkansas, South Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582
(1969); Georgia, Wright v. Hollywood Cemetery Corp., 112 Ga. 884, 38 S.E. 94 (1901); Iowa,
Brause v. Brause, 190 Iowa 329, 177 N.W. 65 (1920); Kentucky, Louisville & N.R. Co. v.
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be difficult to justify granting or denying the exclusion for damages
intended to compensate for emotional suffering simply because one
state considers such damages compensatory and another state considers
them punitive. In sum, the arguments in favor of granting an exclusion
for punitive damages are stronger than those against. While exclusion
of punitive awards is an exception to the general rule of taxing all new
wealth, it is a justifiable exception created by Congress as one of several
provisions designed to provide relief for a taxpayer who has suffered a
catastrophic loss. Many states recognize the compensatory aspects of a
punitive award. It would be inequitable to disallow exclusion merely
because a court labels an award "punitive" when another state would
label the award "compensatory."
A final area of concern is the type of actions to which Revenue
Ruling 75-45 applies. Section 1.104-1(c) of the regulations defines section 104(a)(2) as encompassing amounts received as a result of "a legal
suit or action based upon tort or tort type rights, or through a settlement agreement entered into in lieu of such prosecution."" 3 While recoveries for physical injuries undoubtedly are covered by the section,
recoveries based on mental or emotional injuries are not so obviously
covered.
There is a split in the law over whether the term "personal injury"
includes nonphysical injuries. The basic definition limits the term to
injuries to the body." l4 But many courts and statutes have expanded
the definition to include all actionable injuries to the individual, as distinguished from injuries to property." 5 Under this approach, "personal injury" may include injury affecting the reputation, character, or
Ritchel, 148 Ky. 701, 147 S.W. 411 (1912); Lousiana, Loeblich v. Gamier, 113 So.2d 95 (La.
Ct. App. 1959); Michigan, Tenhopen v. Walker, 96 Mich. 236, 55 N.W. 657 (1893); Missouri,
Beck v. Dowell, II Mo. 506, 20 S.W. 209 (1892); New Hampshire, Vratsenes v. N.H. Auto,
Inc., 112 N.H. 71,289 A.2d 66 (1969); Utah, Palombi v. D & C Builders, 22 Utah 2d 297,452
P.2d 325 (1969). These states either do not allow damages for emotional distress or simply
recognize that the victim of an intentional tort is entitled to additional compensation based
on the nature of the wrong suffered. This suggests a belief that ordinary compensatory damages cannot really make the victim whole. The Michigan Supreme Court commented in
Tenhopen "Usually, where an act is done with design, and from willful and malicious motives, the law compels full compensation, and full compensation may not be awarded by the
payment of the actual value. Damages in excess of the real injury are never appropriate
where the injury has proceeded from misfortune, rather than from any blamable act; but,
where the act or trespass complained of arises from willful and malicious conduct, exemplary damages are recoverable. These damages are not awarded as a punishment to the
wrong-doer, but to compensate the injured party." 96 Mich. at 240, 55 N.W. at 658.
113. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (1960).
114. See, e.g., Lucas v. Lucas Ranching Co., 18 Cal. App. 2d 453, 64 P.2d 160 (1937);
Plum v. Newhart, 118 Cal. App. 73, 4 P.2d 805 (1931). See also 74 AM. JUR. 2d Torts § 2
(1974).
115. Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945); Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987, 39 S.E. 495 (1901); Martin v. Derenbecker, 116 La. 495, 40 So.
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conduct of a person.' 16 The issue has not been directly addressed in tax
litigation. In Seay v. Commissioner,' 17 the tax court was asked to consider the exclusion of damages for "embarrassment." Although the
court observed that both the courts and the Commissioner "have long
recognized that amounts received in settlement of claims arising out of
the alienation of affection or defamation of character are exempt from
taxation,"' 8 it specifically refused to consider the exclusion of damages
levied purely for embarrassment. 1 9 The court held, however, that
damages for embarrassment were excludable if incidental to otherwise
excludable personal injury damages. 120 The approach of the Seay
court was correct and should be followed even when the sole injury is
nonphysical. There is no sound reason not to recognize mental or emotional injuries under section 104(a)(2). Certainly tort law has long
since recognized the significance of nonphysical injuries. Accordingly,
the Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted as having adopted the
more expansive definition of personal injury to protect awards for all
injuries to the person, both mental and physical.

Conclusion
Some uncertainties still exist regarding the deductibility and excludibility of punitive damages award. Nevertheless, proper interpretation of recent events should clarify the general area. The payor of a
punitive damages award should be entitled to deduct the cost of the
award so long as the litigation arises out of business activity and the
deduction is not specifically forbidden by section 162 of the Code. The
recipient of the award should be permitted to exclude it from gross
income only if it arises out of a personal injury or sickness. Otherwise,
the award should be included in gross income and taxed like other
gain.

849 (1906); Tisdale v. Eubanks, 180 N.C. 153, 104 S.E. 339 (1920); Morton v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 130 N.C. 299, 41 S.E. 484 (1902).

116.

See cases cited note 115 supra.

117.

58 T.C. 32 (1972).

118.

Id at 40.

119.
120.

Id.
Id.

